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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

KAREN ANDERSON FAHEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

No. 8373

WILBUR J. C. FAHEY,
Defendant and Appellwnt.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Respondent is not satisfied with the statement of
facts set forth in appellant's brief for the reason that
it is incomplete, misleading and confusing. It pays little
heed to the evidence establishing cruelty, on which ground
the Trial Court awarded a decree of divorce to respondent. Therefore, respondent will set forth her own factual
statement. Appellant's references to the record apparently refer to the typewritten numerals at the upper right
hand corner of the transcript of testimony, but the respondent, when referring to the record, will use the red
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numerals placed at the bottom of each page of the record
by the Clerk of the lower court. In this connedion, it is
noted that the red-numbered pages 95 and 106 are duplicates and that page 95 is not in proper sequence with the
preceding and following pages. The parties will be designated as they appeared upon trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married in the Hawaiian Islands on October 9, 1948, immediately following the
completion by plaintiff of a mission for the L.D.S.
Church. Plaintiff met the defendant during the course
of her mission work and the acquaintance grew to a
closer relationship by means of exchange of letters. Before the marriage there was no courtship, in the ordinary
sense of that word, between the plaintiff and defendant
in view of the position occupied by the plaintiff in the
mission field. This was plaintiff's first marriage.
In the spring of 1949, the parties moved to Salt
Lake City. Defendant's child by a former m·arriage,
Susan, who was age 14 at the time of trial, made her home
with the parties and it is apparent from the entire record
that plaintiff then had, and has always had, a deep and
abiding affection and love for this child. With the consent
of the defendant, plaintiff adopted Susan as her child
in the District Court of Salt Lake County several years
prior to the institution of this divorce action. The only
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5
issue of the marriage Is a son, Michael, born July 17,
1954.
Plaintiff's health has never been good, and in the
years immediately preceding 1954 plaintiff suffered three
miscarriages, was anemic and underwent surgery and
other medical treatment in an effort to enable herself
to carry a child and to correct the anemic condition.
Plaintiff and defendant apparently never made the
physical, mental and sexual adjustments necessary for
a successful marriage. They apparently had not even
held hands prior to the marriage, and following their
first physical contact, plaintiff testified she was ''terrified" (R. 43). Her fear of the defendant because of
the physical and sexual treatment inflicted upon her
gradually grew to hate (R. 43, 44), which emotion "slowly
evolved" (R. 45).
In this most tense and potentially dangerous situation, defendant revealed himself to be possessed of an
explosive and ungovernable temper. He threw food and
dishes out the back door (R. 44). He threw telephone
books across the room and screamed at plaintiff (R. 44).
Although he knew plaintiff was a devout member of the
L.D.S. Church, he cursed the Temple and stormily criticized the church and its authorities (R. 9, 10, 44).
Such conduct was, unfortunately, not a rare occurrence. It happened "frequently" (R. 9). "Night after
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night,'' the peace and quiet of the farnily dinner table was
violated by defendant angrily shouting and yelling his
criticism of plaintiff, her family, her friends and her
church (R. 9, 10). He threatened plaintiff in obscene
language (R. 11) and although he struck plaintiff physically only twice, he constantly threatened to strike her
and apparently vented his spleen by spanking Susan on
frequent occasions.
According to his own admission, he slapped Susan a
number of times (R. 88, 89). On the last such occasion,
streaks were thus raised on the child's face (R. 68). He
took her into the bathroom on this occasion and began to
slap her. Her body was bumping against the wall. He
was "hitting ... with the swing of his arm, from side to
side, about the face and head of his daughter ... " (R. 68).
He stopped only when threatened with the police. As the
Trial Court no doubt observed, he is a large and powerful man.
One of plaintiff's principal grounds of complaint
concerned defendant's practice of forcing himself on her
physically for sexual gratification at times when she was
sick (R. 11), or after a family fight (R. 11 and 37), and
also after she had had a reaction from an improper blood
transfusion ( R. 11).
Defendant is a member of the Air National Guard.
His entire course of conduct, as revealed by this record,
perhaps can best be pictured when it is noted that the
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defendant described himself 1n these words: "I am a
Master Sergeant, as you know, and I like to feel that the
people listen to me ... " (R. 90).
Plaintiff endured this tension-filled atmosphere solely because she wanted to make a home for herself and the
child Susan (R. 47, 48), but when the defendant's conduct continued without change, even after the parties'
own child was born, plaintiff determined that she could
no longer live with the defendant. Her decision in this
regard was hastened by the defendant's brutal slapping
of the child Susan and his smashing her from wall to wall
in the bathroom on August 11, 1954, as related by Mrs.
Byron Anderson Lindsay, plaintiff's mother (R. 68).
Defendant's violent temper is nowhere in the record
better exemplified than by the incident in question. He
stopped only when Mrs. Lindsay threatened to call the
police. Contrary to appellant's assertion that the facts
surrounding this incident are confused and the evidence
conflicting, the facts are crystal clear and were admitted
by the defendant on his direct examination. In the cross
examination of 1[rs. Lindsay, counsel carefully refrained
from attempting any attack upon Mrs. Lindsay's version
of the incident.
An examination of plaintiff's cross examination indicates that her direct testimony concerning the principal
grounds of cruelty was never shaken. Rather, counsel,
upon his cross examination, attempted to establish that
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plaintiff, prior to and shortly following the 1narnage,
was emotionally unstable, apparently in the mistaken
belief that if such a condition could be established it
would constitute provocation for the defendant's unwarranted acts of cruelty.
Finally, appellant's brief is replete with insinuations
and inuendo that the real cause of this divorce was defendant's mother-in-law. Such a claim is without foundation in the evidence, for the defendant, although invited
by his counsel to testify to this effect, stated (R. 85) that
after his mother-in-law moved to Salt Lake City he ''had
a feeling our marriage was not quite as private as it had
been and I felt that somehow there was more than on~
person had - I seemed to feel an influence." The last
paragraph of defendant's testimony (R. 92) outlines the
defendant's theory of the difficulty with the marriage,
and it is interesting to note that although the defendant
assigned a number of reasons for the marriage difficulty,
at no time did he mention the influence of his mother-inlaw.
upon this state of the record the Trial Court found
that defendant had been guilty of cruel treatment, causing plaintiff great mental distress, and awarded plaintiff
a decree of divorce. The disposition of property, as outlined by the Trial Court, was formulated in an effort
to rnake certain plaintiff would have a place to live for
herself and the children and recognized that she had
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9
the greater need for the family automobile than did the
defendant. No doubt much of the Trial Court's disposition of property was dictated by the fact that plaintiff
had worked throughout the major portion of the marriage
and must now continue to work. She has made substantial financial contributions to the assets accumulated during the marriage. She was awarded the furnishings in
the family home, the use of the home, and the family
car. She is still paying for the car. She was awarded
$125.00 per month for support money for the children.
Defendant earns approximately $450.00 per month and
thus it is seen he retains more than 70% of his income
for his own use.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THERE WAS AMPLE .COMPE'TENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE AWARDED TO
PLAINTIFF BY THE TRIAL COURT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
REJECTING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS AND PROFFERS
OF PROOF AND, IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT HAS
FAILED TO SHOW HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE
COURT'S RULINGS.

ARGUMENT
I. THERE WAS AMPLE ·COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE AWARDED TO
PLAINTIFF BY THE TRIAL COURT.

A thorough examination of the record in this case
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can leave no doubt that there was an1ple com pC'tent evidence to support the Trial Court's findings. Fr01n the beginning of the marriage plaintiff was not in good physical health and obviously she was mentally

distre~;~e<l

b)·

the cruelty of the defendant. Despite this fact, and despite the fact that her condition was well known to her
husband, the record reveals that at no time did he m:1ke
any effort to change his conduct, but rather continued to
allow free rein to a temper which rnounted in ferocity
the rnore his will was thwarted. Courts do not and should
not condone conduct such as is revealed by this record.
Defendant cornplains that the Trial Court committed
an act of judicial legislation in that this divorce, so he
claims, was granted upon the ground of incompatability.
It is suggested that the remarks of the Trial Court be
read in context and in their entirety in order that the
attitude of the Court n1ay be fairly appraised.
The Trial Court never used the word '· incompatability, '' but counsel constantly suggested that this was
the ground of the Court's ruling. To this comn1ent, the
Court simply said, ''The Supren1e Court just about decided it in that case.'' The Court \\·as apparently referring to the case of Hendricks vs. Hendricks, :237 P. 2d
366, decided in 1953. When counsel asked if the divorce
in the present case was being gran ted on the grounds of
incon1patability, the Court replied, ''I have not discussed
this one yet.'' The Court was merely outlining what he
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11
felt to be a comparable situation to the case at bar.
Counsel then commenced his argument, claiming
that there vvere no grounds for a divorce, but the Court
said (R. 99), "He screams and shouts and indulges in sex
relations without adequate preliminary preparation,
that is sufficient for a divorce for a sensitive person.''
In commenting upon the defense raised by the defendant to this action, the Court summed up its views of
the en tire case in this language :
''Most of the evidence you are offering is not
showing he was driven to it. I think there are
sufficient grounds if we cannot see the marriage
as feasible to grant the remedy." (R. 103).
Thus it appears that the Court felt that there had
been eruelty on the part of the defendant, that all of the
fault had not been on one side, that the marriage relationship was intolerable, and that if the court ordered
them to go along as man and wife, they nevertheless
would not reconcile (R. 103). This seems to respondent
to bnng the case at bar squarely within the Hen,dricks
case, and particularly within that portion of Mr. Justice
Wade's opinion wherein he said:
"From anything that appears in the instant
case, no good purpose, either social, moral, ethical
or legal could be served by refusing to grant a divorce and settle the property rights of the parties.
It would he but a mockery of the true concept of
matrimony to thus purport to compel these two
people, clearly ill suited and maladjusted to each
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other to continue to retain the legal relationship
of husband and wife.''
"Incompatability," as that term is customarily used,
is not a ground for divorce in the State of Utah. The
Trial Court did not grant this divorce on such a ground.
Rather, the Court found that the defendant had treated
the plaintiff cruelly, and that such conduct to a less sensitive person might be overlooked, but that each case must
be decided upon its own facts, having in mind the nature
and characteristics of the parties involved. The Court
merely stated what seems to respondent to be palpably
clear: that what constitutes cruelty to one person may
be of no moment or bother to another person.
Defendant, being confronted with a record replete
with evidence of cruelty, has entered, as expected, a denial of such conduct, stating (R. 90) that the conduct as
related by plaintiff was not his "normal way around the
house.'' The Trial Court, as the trier of the fact, was
in position to observe the witnesses upon the witness
stand and to judge their credibility, and as is clear from
the summary of the case given by the Court, he found
plaintiff's specific allegations more believable than the
perfunctory denial by the defendant.
Counsel for defendant apparently recognizes the
fundamental proposition that under these circumstances,
it is his burden to convince the Supreme Court that the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of the
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Trial Court and that prejudicial error has resulted. Counsel thereupon, in his brief, undertakes to fulfill this formidable task by tacitly admitting that defendant was
guilty of cruel conduct, but throws the blame upon the
mother-in-law and upon plaintiff, who, he says, goaded
the defendant into his cruelty.
\Y e challenge counsel to cite any instance in the
record from which a fact can be inferred that the motherin-law was in any way interfering with the marriage.
Counsel did not seek to draw evidence of such interference from his client, nor did he question plaintiff about
this phase of the case. Further, he confined his examination of the mother-in-law to searching out the question
of whether or not she had eavesdropped at a reconciliation meeting attended by the parties. Such unwarranted
accusations of interference are not supported in any way
by the record. In his decision, the Trial Court said:
''We have not had any evidence here as to
any particular like or dislike on the part of plaintiff's mother ... "
The claim that l\lrs. Lindsay was furthering her designs
and schemes, as alleged on page 21 of counsel's brief, not
only is without basis anywhere in the evidence, but is an
unseemly attempt to turn the attention of this Court
from the true facts in the case in an effort to arouse prejudice in the eyes of the reviewing authority.
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Likewise there is no evidence in the record to support the charge that plaintiff goaded the defendant into
his cruelty. Defendant's counsel repeatedly insisted
plaintiff was, and is, neurotic. The Trial Court apparently believed this to be so (R. 102). But, defendant has
cited no authority for the proposition that a husband,
whose wife is so afflicted, may treat his wife cruelly
and then escape the consequences of his conduct upon the
ground that the affliction provoked the cruelty.
It is clear from plaintiff's testimony that she had
endured much in the years prior to Michael's birth in
1954. She apparently hoped that with the birth ·of their
child things would be better for the family. It was only
when defendant stood over the crib of the child and
screamed and shouted at plaintiff that she realized that
her efforts had been futile and that the marriage was impossible. Even so, she was not provoked into instituting
an action in the courts until she learned of the defendant's unwarranted beating of the child Susan as related
by Mrs. Lindsay. It is reasonable to infer from the evidence that she examined the welts on the child's face and
heard the child's story, and that she thereupon determined to obtain a divorce. Defendant's attitude throughout this marriage is thoroughly exemplified when he
seeks to excuse his beating of Susan by alleging she was
"bordering on delinquency" (Brief, page 9). There is no
evidence to support this charge and it ill behooves either
the defendant or his counsel to place such an accusation
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15
against a child in an official record in this state.
A fair reading of defendant's brief leads irresistibly to the conclusion that defendant admits there was evidence of cruelty, but that defendant contends the Trial
Court should have believed defendant's testimony rather
than the evidence offered by plaintiff and on her behalf.
Defendant apparently asks that the Supreme Court substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Trial Court,
but no reason is assigned why this Court ought to depart
from the long-established principle that the Court: "will
not upset findings of the Trial Court on issues in which
the testimony was in conflict, unless the record shows
that such findings are clearly against the weight of the
evidence.'' Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. (2d)
428; Alldredge v. Alldredge, 229 P. (2d) 681.
This Court has consistently followed this policy because, as stated in the Alldredge case:
''The Trial Court has a better opportunity
to judge the credibility of the witnesses and weight
of their testimony. Especially is this true in cases
involving quarrels between spouses.''
In a case decided in 1952, the appellant claimed that
the Supreme Court should examine the record and should
reverse the decree of the Trial Court and instead grant
him a divorce. He also contended that the property division by the Trial Court was not supported by the evidence. In rejecting appellant's contention, this Court
said:
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''This court is reluctant to rnodify a divorce
decree because usually the evidence is contradictory and the Trial Court having seen and heard
the witnesses, is more able to determine their
credibility than we are. Also, in the absence of an
abuse of discretion we do not disturb the property
division." Lawlor v. Lawlor, 240 P. (2d) 271.
It is perfectly clear from the record in this case that
the Trial Court was convinced that the evidence proved
cruelty causing great mental distress to a degree sufficient to constitute grounds for a divorce under Utah Law.
An examination of the comments of the Trial Court after
both sides had rested, reveals at least five separate statements to this effe-ct. (R. 99, 101, 102, 103, 111).
The Trial Court was unusually careful in his determination of the facts in this case and in his disposition
of the marriage property. Defendant claims in his brief
that he salvaged nothing from the marriage. It is perhaps appropriate to point out that the defendant by his
conduct is not entitled to salvage anything from this
marriage, which his conduct wrecked. Title 30-3-9, UGA,
1953, provides :
"When a divorce is decreed the guilty party
forfeits all rights acquired by marriage.''
The Trial Court, despite this statute, did not deprive defendant of his equity in the family residence, even
though counsel for appellant would have us believe that
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the disposition of the residence property by the Trial
Court constitutes an "illusory" award to the defendant.
Counsel claims that the award is ''illusory~' because
if the house is sold plaintiff would be entitled to recover
from the proceeds the amounts she pays for mortgage
payments, interest and taxes from the date of the divorce
to the date of sale. A n1oment's reflection will show
that with each such payment the equity of the parties
increases and assuming that the present value of the
house is not changed by inflation or deflation, defendant
is still entitled to his portion of his present equity and
plaintiff, if the house should be sold, will merely be reimbursed for what she has paid. Defendant seems to assume that such reimbursement will come from his share
of the equity, but once again the facts do not bear out this
contention.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
REJECTING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS AND PROFFERS
OF PROOF AND, IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT HAS
FAILED TO SHOW HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE
COURT'S RULINGS.

Defendant complains because the Trial Court rejected Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 8 through 15. All of these Exhibits,
except Exhibit 15, were letters which passed from plaintiff to defendant in the summer of 1948, several months
before the parties were Inarried. The letters indicate
that plaintiff professed love for the defendant and in
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fact, her letters to him and the letters he presumably
wrote her constituted the ·only courtship that these
parties experienced before the marriage.
However, the letters in no way tend to disprove
plaintiff's contention that her superior in the mission
field exerted pressure upon her to get married in the
Hawaiian Islands. Plaintiff admitted that she loved the
defendant before the marriage and the rejected exhibits
merely tend to confirm that fact, but it seems abundantly
clear that plaintiff might not have wanted to get married
at that time and in that place, particularly in the absence
of her family. Thus it is seen that the letters do not support defendant's contention.
Even if the Exhibits did tend to disprove plaintiff's
testimony, defendant has cited no authority to show, nor
has any argument been made, that the Exhibits were
material to the issues in the case by way of defense or
explanation for defendant's conduct.
Defendant likewise complains that the court committed error in refusing to allow him to obtain certain witnesses to testify in accordance with the offer of proof
outlined by counsel for the defendant (R. 93, 94). No
attempt was made in the lower Court and none has been
made here to show what, if any, effect such testimony
could have had upon the issues in this case. There is
no showing that any of the evidence was material or
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would have constituted a defense sufficient to inure to
defendant's benefit.

It is a familiar doctrine that the conduct of the trial
by the Trial Court is a matter largely within the discretion of that Court, and unless it is shown upon appeal
that the Court abused its discretion to the prejudice of the
appellant, the rulings of the Trial Court will ordinarily
not be disturbed.
It is submitted by the plaintiff that neither the record
nor defendant's brief on appeal reveal an abuse of discretion, and even if an abuse of discretion could be inferred from the record, there has been no showing that
prejudice resulted to the defendant. The Trial Court
evidently assumed much of what defendant desired to
prove, because he commented on several occasions to the
effect that plaintiff was overly sensitive and in fact implied that he thought she was neurotic (R. 102).
CONCLUSION

This case was tried in the District Court, March 8,
1955. Prior to that time there had been three separate
hearings, concerning the conduct of the defendant or the
disposition of the property or the children (R. 109). Following trial in March, defendant objected to the proposed
Findings of Fact and the parties again appeared before

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r
20
the Trial Court. At that time, after full arguinent, the
Trial Court made changes in the proposed Findings.
Therefore, the Findings of Fact and Decree represent the
considered and deliberate judgment of the Court.
Under these circums,tances, and in view of the entire
record, we submit the decision of the lower Court is correct and ought to be affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted,
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SKEEN,THURMAN,WORSLEY
& SNOW
.Attorneys for Plantiff and
Respondent
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